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Abstract In this paper we focus on the detection of network anomalies like Denial
of Service (DoS) attacks and port scans in a unified manner. While there has been an
extensive amount of research in network anomaly detection, current state of the art
methods are only able to detect one class of anomalies at the cost of others. The key
tool we will use is based on the spectral decomposition of a trajectory/hankel matrix
which is able to detect deviations from both between and within correlation present
in the observed network traffic data. Detailed experiments on synthetic and real net-
work traces shows a significant improvement in detection capability over competing
approaches. In the process we also address the issue of robustness of anomaly detec-
tion systems in a principled fashion.
Keywords Anomaly Detection · Hankel Matrix · SVD
1 Introduction
In its most abstract form, network traffic can be described by a time series y(t), where
y represents the observed state of the traffic. For example, y(t) could simply be the
total number of packets or could be a vector, where each component represents an ac-
tive flow. A flow is an aggregation of packets by attributes like source and destination
ip address.
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Fig. 1: (a) An example of two flows f1 and f2 experiencing two different anomalies
DoS attack (D) and port scan (P). (b) SVD finds D anomaly and misses P one as it
is in its normal space. (c) and (d): mapping the f1 and f2 vector into a 2-dimensional
space and applying SVD both P and D anomalies are detectable.
In order to detect anomalies in network traffic we must first model the generative
process, which gives rise to the observable time series < y(t) >. Assume that the
latent variables x(t). The relationship between y(t) and x(t) can be abstractly repre-
sented by a model as y(t) = f (x(t)). We can learn the model and obtain an estimation
as yˆ = f (xˆ(t)). Then an anomaly occurs of time t if y(t)− yˆ(t) is greater than a pre-
defined threshold. In order to design the generative model we have to capture different
forms of correlation between variables of the system which we describe here.
1.1 Between and Within Flow Correlation
An important aspect that needs to be captured in any model of network traffic is the
presence of between and within correlation in packet flows. For example, consider
Figure 1(a), which shows the the time series of two flows, f1(t) and f2(t). The point
labeled D is an example where the correlation within flow f1(t) flows has deviated
from the expected norm. Similarly, the point labeled P is where the correlation be-
tween the two flows f1 and f2 has deviated in a localized time window. The anomaly
D is an example of a Denial of Service (DoS) attack while an anomaly P is an exam-
ple of port scan. Discovering events like P and D is the focus of this paper.
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1.2 The Trajectory/Hankel Matrix
A key tool that we will use to detect correlation deviation in network traffic, is the tra-
jectory (or Hankel) matrix that will be constructed from the observed time series (see
Takens et al (1981); Broomhead and King (1986a)). For example, given two flows
{ f1(i), f2(i)}Ti=1, the Hankel matrix (H) of window length L < T of the two flows is
given by


f1(1) . . . f1(L)
f1(2) . . . f1(L+ 1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
f1(T −L+ 1) . . . f1(T )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f2(1) . . . f2(L)
f2(2) . . . f2(L+ 1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
f2(T −L+ 1) . . . f2(T )


Now the key insight of the paper, is that the SVD of correlation (or covariance)
matrix of the Hankel matrix (H), will capture both between and within correlation in
network flows. Thus a low rank decomposition of H will characterize the manifold
structure M between the flows as well as help identify the anomalies which deviate
from the inferred manifold structure. For example, Figure 1(b), shows the relationship
between the flows f1 and f2 and also the direction of the most dominant eigenvector
of the standard correlation matrix (without the time lag). This decomposition is un-
able to capture the port scan (P) anomaly because, P is not a simple violation of the
between flow correlation but the existing correlation is violated only in a localized
time window. In Figure 1(c), it is clear that a time window lag (L = 1), captures the
spatial correlation in a small time window and thus the P anomaly is away from the
main eigenvector. In Figure 1(d), there is no correlation violation within flow f2 and
thus the P anomaly is in the direction of the main eigenvector.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3 explains the tech-
nique behind the singular spectrum analysis and its extension and compares both
techniques with PCA. Section 5 presents a validation of the different analysis algo-
rithm based on SSA on a real traffic data and analyses their capability for anomaly
detection. A brief background is presented in section 6 and we discuss some conclu-
sion remarks in section 7.
2 Hankel Matrix and Generative Model
We now justify the decomposition of the Hankel matrix based on a generative model
of the data. In particular we will show that if data is generated by a Linear Dyanmical
System (LDS), then the SVD decomposition of the Hankel matrix can be used to
estimate the LDS.
Assume data is generated from a Linear Dynamical System (LDS) given by:
x(t + 1) = Ax(t)+w(t)
y(t) =Cx(t)+ v(t)
where
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Observations
Y(t)=CX(t)
X(t+1)=AX(t) 
θ =(A,C)
Fig. 2: A linear dynamic latent model (LDS)
– x(t) ∈ Rn is the system state vector,
– A defines the system’s dynamics,
– w is the vector that captures the system error, e.g. a random vector from N (0,Q),
– y(t) ∈ Rm is the observation vector,
– C) is the measurement function,
– v is the vector that represents the measurement error, e.g. a random vector from
N (0,R),
Fig.2 presents a graphical model of LDS.
Problem 1 Assume that data is generated from an LDS governed by the equation
above. Given a sequence of observations {yi}ni=1, estimate A,C,Q and R.
To solve the above problem, we need to define the Hankel matrix of the observa-
tions as
H(t) =


y(t) y(t + 1) y(t + 2) ... y(n− ℓ+ 1)
y(t + 1) y(t + 2)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
y(t + ℓ) . . . y(n)


where y(t) is m× n observation at time t, and H is a ℓ× n′ where n′ = n− ℓ+ 1.
Equivalently, H is a Hankel matrix if and only if there exists a sequence ,s1,s2, ...
such that Hi, j = si+ j−1 (see Iokhvidov et al (1982)). Therefore, every Hankel matrix
uniquely determines a time series and every time series can be transferred into a
Hankel matrix, i.e.:
H(t− i)⇔ yi(t)
where yi(t) = {y(i),y(i+ 1), ...,y(t), ...}. By replacing the entries of the Hankel ma-
trix with their equivalent from the LDS:
H(1) =


CAx(0) CAx(1) CAx(2) ... CAx(n− ℓ)
CAx(1) CAx(2)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
CAx(ℓ−1) . . . CAx(n−1)

=


CAx(0) CA2x(0) CA3x(0) ... CAn−ℓ+1x(0)
CA2x(0) CA3x(0)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
CAℓx(0) . . . CAnx(0)


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=
(
CA CA2 CA3 ... CAℓ
)T · (x(0) Ax(0) A2x(0) . . . An−ℓ−2x(0))
Define:
P =
(
CA CA2 CA3 ... CAℓ
)T
Q = (x(0) Ax(0) A2x(0) . . . An−ℓ−2x(0))
then:
H(1) = PQ
The shifted Hankel matrices can be described by:
H(i) = PAi−1Q
To obtain the matrices A and B, perform singular value decomposition of H(1):
H(1) =UΣ2V T
where Σ2 is a diagonal ℓ× ℓ matrix containing the singular values and the ℓ columns
of U are the singular vectors. Selecting the top-k (1 < k < ℓ) singular values from the
matrix Σ2,denoted by Σk, and k associated singular vectors, denoted by Uk, we define
reduced rank matrices:
Pk
.
= UkΣk
Qk .= ΣkV T
Using the 1-shifted Hankel matrix H(2) and the reduced rank matrices Pk and Qk:
H(2) = PkAkQk
=UkΣAkΣV T
Then the matrix Ak can be approximated as:
Ak = (UkΣk)−1H(2)(ΣkV T )−1
Then, given Ak we can estimate Ck as:
Ck = P−11 Ak
where P1 is the first m rows of the matrix P. Given Ak and Ck, we can estimate
δk = y− yˆ
= y−Ckxˆ
An outlier is reported whenever |δk| exceeds a predefined threshold.
In practice, we are able to use the decomposition of the Hankel matrix to identify
outliers. Recall once again the SDV of the Hankel matrix:
H(1) =UΣ2V T
= ∑ki=1 λ 1/2i UiV ′i +∑ℓi=k+1 λ 1/2i UiV ′i
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If we define ˆH .= ∑ki=1 λ 1/2i UiV ′i and ∆k
.
= ∑ℓi=k+1 λ 1/2i UiV ′i then:
∆k = H(1)− ˆH
We know that every Hankel matrix is associated with a time series. Therefore if
these matrices would be Hankel then we can obtain the error space. This can be
performed by means of diagonal averaging procedure. The averaging over the diago-
nals i+ j = const of a matrix is called Hankelization. It transforms an arbitrary ℓ×n′
matrix to the form of a Hankel matrix, which can be subsequently converted to a time
series. A Detailed procedure of Hankeliztion is given in Appendix A.
3 Multivariate Singular Spectrum Analysis
The application of SVD to Hankel matrix is known as SSA or M-SSA. The key
advantage of M-SSA is its ability to succinctly capture both between (spatial) and
within (temporal) correlation in the underlying network traffic flows. Here we give a
step-by-step introduction to SSA, as a method of discovering anomalies.
1. Assume the network flow volume through a router at a pre-specified level of gran-
ularity (e.g.five minutes) is given by the time series.
y1,y2, . . . ,ym,wm+1,wm+2, . . . ,wn,yn+1,yn+2, . . .
We have used both y and w to indicate that the nature of traffic has changed for
n−m+ 1 time steps after ym. In practice we of course don’t know where and
when the traffic changes and is precisely what we want to infer.
2. Choose an integer ℓ < m, known as the embedding dimension and form the Han-
kel matrix for the x part of the time series.
Y =


y1 y2 . . . yℓ
y2 y3 . . . yℓ+1
. . . . . . . . . . . .
ym−ℓ+1 ym−ℓ+2 . . . ym


Where each Yi = (yi,yi+1, . . . ,yi+ℓ)′, is of dimension ℓ. In SSA, the assumption
is that Y captures the main dynamics of the network flow. We now apply the Sin-
gular Value Decomposition (SVD) of Y as follows.
3. For the ℓ× ℓ covariance matrix of Y give by
C = Y ×Y ′
4. Compute the eigendecomposition of C = [U,D] where U is matrix where each
column is a eigenvector and D is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues. The rela-
tionship between C, U and D is given as
CU(:, i) = D(i, i)U(:, i) for each i
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5. Form an k-dimensional subspace M of Rℓ where k ≤ ℓ, by using the top-k eigen-
vectors of U , i.e., M =UsU ′s. The space M is where the “normal” traffic lives and
our objective is to look for changes in the flow which cannot be explained by M.
This is achieved by projecting a sliding window of ℓ dimensional vectors on M
and raising an alarm whenever the deviation between a vector and its projection
on M becomes large.
6. For example, consider a ℓ-dim vector which contains parts of the changed traffic
y′is.
z = (ym−1,ym,w1, . . . ,wℓ−m−1)′.
Then, the deviation between z and its projection on M is given by e = ‖z−Mz‖.
Assuming that the wi’s were generated by anomalous traffic, then the deviation e
will be large relative to deviations caused by normal traffic.
7. To reconstruct the refined time series we proceed in a manner inverse to the step
2. On the other hand, if the objective is to reconstruct the original time series
then we have to apply a hankelization (inverse) operator. The network anomaly
detection process remains unaffected by the inverse operation. More details can
be found in Vautard and Ghil (1989); Ghil et al (2002); Golyandina et al (2010).
Before we go into further details about SSA we illustrate the key steps using a simple
example.
Example 1 Assume that a sample time series is given as
y(t) =


sin(.2t)+ ε(t) if 1 ≤ t ≤ 175
sin(.3t)+ ε(t) if 176≤ t ≤ 375
sin(.2t)+ ε(t) if 376≤ t ≤ 560
Here ε(t) is gaussian N (0,1) noise. Notice that there is a change in the time series
between t = 176 and t = 376. Fig. 3(a and b) show the example time series without
the noise and the time series with added noise. Fig. 3(c) shows the deviation of the
signal for different values of ℓ and k. It is clear that the deviation becomes larger near
time step 176 and then returns to its normal value after the change signal disappears
around time step 376.
3.1 Choice of Parameters in SSA
The key idea in SSA is the use of a trajectory matrix Y which then factorized using
SVD. The formal relationship between Y and the underlying dynamics of the time
series has been extensively researched in both the statistics and physics community.
The key take away from the theoretical literature is that for an appropriate choice
of ℓ, the trajectory matrix will capture the appropriate dynamics of the underlying
system (see Takens et al (1981); Broomhead and King (1986a,c,b)). The choice of
ℓ along with k (the dimensionality of the projected subspace) and the threshold (e)
are three important parameters that need to calibrated and set. These parameters are
8 Tahereh Babaie et al.
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Fig. 3: An example of using SSA to detect changes in a time series for various com-
bination of parameter values ℓ and k. The time series changes in the middle which is
reflected in the deviation in the bottom figure.
like “knobs” which a network administrator can use to adapt to specific network
characteristics.
Example 1 above already provides some indication of how the choices of ℓ and
k have on time series monitoring. For example, for ℓ = 20, the deviation e is less
than for other values of ℓ. This may surprising at first but notice the initial part of the
time series has an intrinsic dimensionality of 1 (as it is composed of one sin term).
Thus a smaller value of ℓ is better at capturing the dynamics of the time series than a
larger value ℓ= 50,70. Now consider, the two cases where L = 50 but k = 2 or k = 4.
Notice that the projected error (in the middle) is almost identical but at the tails the
projection error is higher for k = 2 than k = 4. This shows that while the choice of k
has a significant impact on the projection error of the normal traffic, when it comes
to detecting the anomalous part the method is quite robust for different choices of k.
In fact this is one of the key strengths of SSA that we will exploit in the analysis of
real network traffic data.
4 Network Anomaly Types
A key contribution of our paper is that the approach based on M-SSA is able to detect
almost all known types of network anomalies. In this section we describe the differ-
ent types of common anomalies and explain why M-SSA provides subsumes other
anomaly detectors. Table 1 lists the common anomalies defined using the flow as a 5-
tuple (source IP address, destination IP address, source port number, destination port
Network Traffic Decomposition for Anomaly Detection 9
Table 1: Network anomalies considered
Anomalies Description (flow is defined as one 5-tuple)
DoS attack a few flows with a large increase in packet count
port scan large increase in number of flows with a small packet count
large file transfer a few flows with a large increase in packet count, (but typically less than DoS
attack)
prefix outages drop in number of flows (from one IP prefix)
link outages time intervals where all traffic disappear.
number, transport protocol). More details can be found in Silveira et al (2010a,b);
Lakhina et al (2005, 2004a).
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack occurs when the attacking hosts send a large num-
ber of small packets - typically TCP SYN segments - to the attacked host and service,
i.e. a single IP address and port number, in order to deplete the system resources in
the target host. The resulting traffic from DoS attack consists of a relatively small
number of flows with large packet counts as DoS attack tools often forge the source
port number. Note that the specific case of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) at-
tacks is effectively the same attack, but with several source IP addresses. The number
of attacking hosts however, is typically much smaller than the packet count. We thus
consider DDoS to be a special case of a DoS attack, and label as such.
Port scans are typically used by attackers to discover open ports on the target host.
This is accomplished by sending small packets as connections requests to a large
number of different ports on a single destination IP address. At the flow level, they
are therefore characterized as an increase in the number of flows, each with a small
packet count.
Large file transfers are characterized by a few flows with packet counts which are
significantly larger than what common applications use.
Prefix outages occurs when part of the network becomes unreachable, they can be
identified when traffic from one or more IP prefixes disappears, which translates in a
drop in the number of flows.
Link outage is in a way a more severe version of Prefix outage, where the number of
flows on the link drop close to zero.
5 Experimental evaluation
We have evaluated our proposed approach using both real and synthetic data sets. For
comparison we have implemented well known network anomaly techniques based
on wavelets, kalman filtering, fourier analysis and the more recent ASTUTE method.
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The use of synthetic data sets and simulation is a prerequisite for a rigorous evaluation
strategy for network anomaly detection (Ringberg et al (2008); Soule et al (2005);
Silveira et al (2010a)).
Table 2: Alternative methods used in the experiments
Techniques are implemented by adjusting parameters as proposed in the literature.
Fourier analysis Zhang et al (2005)
We use fast Fourier transform (FFT) algorithm and set the cut off frequency to one cycle per 2 hours.
Wavelet analysis Barford et al (2002); Zhang et al (2005)
We use a multi-level, 1-dimension wavelet algorithm, with Daubechies mother wavelet of order 6
and set the cut off frequency to 3.
Kalman Filter Soule et al (2005)
The target false positive rate of 2×10−5 is applied to the innovation process.
ASTUTE Silveira et al (2010a,b)
The target false positive rate of 2×10−5 is applied to the AAV process.
5.1 Detection Capability
We evaluate the detection capability of M-SSA using two real network traces which
we now describe.
5.1.1 Datasets
The first traffic trace if from the Abilene network1 and has been used previously for
network anomaly detection (see Silveira et al (2010a,b); Lakhina et al (2005, 2004a)).
The data set consists of a one month traffic trace from a backbone router in New York
during August 2007. The Juniper router used to collect the data generated sampled
J-flow statistics at the rate of 1/100. The flows were aggregated at five minute inter-
vals. The key attributes of the flow are: number of packets, number of distinct source
IP addresses, number of distinct destination IP addresses, number of distinct source
port numbers and number of distinct destination ports numbers.
The second, and more recent, traffic trace is from the MAWI (Measurement and
Analysis on the WIDE Internet) archive project in Japan2. Here the data was sampled
from a 150Mbps trans-pacific link between Japan and the United States for 63-hours
in April 2012.
Labelling traffic traces with anomalies is notoriously difficult. The commonly ac-
cepted method is to combine algorithmic detection with manual inspection of the
1 Internet2 - http://www.internet2.edu/
2 http://www.wide.ad.jp/project/wg/mawi.html
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data. We have followed the URCA (Unsupervised Root Cause Analysis) method pro-
posed by Silveira and Diot (2010) with a false positive rate of 2×10−9, followed by
a thorough manual inspection of the data set.
5.1.2 Results
Table 3 and Fig. 9 show the results of the different methods including M-SSA. The
following are the key take aways.
1. M-SSA is capable of detecting a much wider range of anomalies regardless of
their types. For the Abilene data, M-SSA was able to identify 100% of DoS at-
tacks and over 95% port scans. Similarly on the MAWI data set the detection rate
was 100% for DoS attacks and over 90% for port scans.
2. All other techniques (which were compared) can be placed in two groups: Wavelets,
Kalman and Fourier have high detection rates only for DoS attacks while AS-
TUTE performs exceedingly well only for port scan anomalies.
3. In the Abilene data, around 7% of the anomalies are related to link outages. Here
again, M-SSA has a 100% detection rate and except for Fourier, other techniques
also have a high detection rate with Wavelets doing the best.
To understand the results better we have carried out a deeper analysis by examin-
ing the characteristic features of the anomalies. In Fig. 5 we plot the known Abilene
anomalies using two features. The x-axis represents the change in packet counts be-
tween two consecutive time bins. The y-axis represents the number of distinct flows
(5 tuples) in the time bin.
The first observation is that the set of anomalies are clustered in distinct groups,
with the set of anomalies detected by Wavelet and Kalman approximately common
(Wavelet is slightly better in detecting some port scans). Secondly, the Kalman filter
and Wavelet techniques are not able to find anomalies caused by large number of
flows with small packet counts. These includes anomalies where the rate of change in
packet count in individual flows over time is small, e.g. port scans, prefix outages and
file transfers. Wavelet as a time-frequency technique is able to flag sudden changes
in traffic, but will miss any small variations such as port scans and absorb them in the
main trend.
The Kalman filter technique is effective at detecting anomalies when the packet
count variation over time is significant, such as DoS attacks. This is expected, as
Kalman Filtering is essentially a forecasting technique in the time dimension. An-
other observation is that ASTUTE is not able to detect anomalies involving a few large
flows (bottom right hand corner of Fig. 5), such as DoS attacks. This is also ex-
pected, as ASTUTE is not able to detect large volume change in a few number of
flows, because the AAV process threshold is not violated (as the denominator of AAV
is the standard deviation which will be large) as mentioned by Silveira et al (2010b);
Silveira and Diot (2010).
The results and analysis clearly suggest, as has been noted before by Silveira et al
(2010a), that a hybrid approach consisting of ASTUTE and Kalman (or Wavelet) will
capture most of the anomalies. Importantly, Fig. 5 shows that the proposed M-SSA
based approach is able to detect anomalies regardless of their location on the feature
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Table 3: Number of anomalies per type found by each technique in two traffic traces
from Abilene and WIDE networks. M-SSA is able to discover both DoS and port
scan in both networks.
Trace: Internet2, from Abilene backbone
Period: August 2007
ASTUTE Kalman Wavelet Fourier M-SSA Hybrid†
Anomalies class Labeled
DoS attacks 44 1 37 41 17 44 44
port scans 221 198 0 18 0 211 216
large-file transfer 2 2 0 0 0 2 2
link outage 18 12 12 17 6 18 18
prefix outage 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
Total found 276 214 51 76 265 271
Trace: MAWI, from WIDE backbone
Period: April 2012‡
ASTUTE Kalman Wavelet Fourier M-SSA Hybrid†
Anomalies class Labeled
DoS attacks 9 1 7 8 4 9 9
port scans 98 89 11 19 0 89 89
large-file transfer 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
link outage 2 2 1 1 0 2 2
Total found 111 93 20 28 4 101 101
† Hybrid refers to ASTUTE ∪ Kalman ∪ Wavelet
‡ This a 63-hours trace in the early days of the month.
properties map. M-SSA is able to detect significant temporal changes in traffic as
well as changes in the number of flows. M-SSA searches for correlation across flows
properties (ASTUTE applies the same search concept between flows), while at the same
time looking for temporal variation in a lag window dimension of ℓ. ASTUTE is limited
to two consecutive time bins.
5.2 Detection Performance
In order to evaluate the robustness and sensitivity of M-SSA we have designed a
simulation set up where we inject artificial anomalies in real traces and measure the
trade-off between the true positive and false positives using ROC curves. One of
the biggest challenges in network anomaly detection systems, and which has limited
their widespread adoption, is the high false positive rate exhibited by most existing
techniques (see Ringberg et al (2008); Axelsson (2000)).
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Fig. 4: Timeseries plots of measured and reconstructed data along with related resid-
ual vector squared magnitude; for one day of both traffic traces from Abilene and
WIDE networks. Triggered alarms shown as red circles.
5.2.1 Simulation
Our simulation is based on real trace data augmented with anomalous traffic in-
jected in a similar fashion as in Silveira et al (2010a); Ringberg et al (2008); Axelsson
(2000). However and in addition to previous work, we build a simulation model which
captures several distinctive characteristics of anomalies. We consider the distribution
of time between anomalies, duration, magnitude (packet count for DoS attacks, num-
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Fig. 5: Anomalies feature map shows DoS attacks are associated with a small number
of flows with large number of packets, while port scans are a larger number of flows
correlated in same time. The coverage of M-SSA subsumes all the techniques.
ber of flows for port scans, etc), and the anomaly type distribution (DoS, port scan,
etc).
We first estimate the above parameters based on available observations in traffic
traces. For example Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show the histograms of these property values
for DoS attacks and port scans respectively, as observed in the Abilene trace. We
start the simulation assuming a non-anomalous time bin and choose the next attack
time, by sampling from the empirical probability distribution of the time between
anomalies. The anomaly type is then also chosen by sampling from the anomaly type
distribution. At this point, a synthetic anomaly is generated by sampling from the
anomaly duration and magnitude distribution, and injected into the synthetic trace.
This process is repeated until the end of the simulation. The resulting trace therefore
inherit the most significant statistical properties of the real data, e.g. the frequency of
attacks and their magnitude.
5.2.2 Results
The trade-off between false positive and true positive rate using the simulation data
are captured using the ROC curve and are shown in Fig. 8. The simulation parameters
for all algorithms are set as per Table 2. The ROC curves depicted in Fig. 8 show that
M-SSA has higher true positive rate for a given false positive rate, compared with all
other techniques. For example, for a false positive rate of 0.01%, M-SSA detects 90%
of anomalies, whereas Wavelet and ASTUTE only detect 77% and 81% respectively.
A Hybrid detector including Wavelets, Kalman and ASTUTE shows slightly better
trade-off for a false positive rate less than 10−5 but M-SSA is better for the rest of
interval. The Area Under Curve (AUC) which measures the overall performance of
the detector has been shown in Fig. 8 (left).
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Fig. 6: Illustration of the distribution histograms used to simulate DoS attacks. Distri-
bution histograms characterize the duration of attacks and size of attack (e.g. number
of flows involved in the attack plus the change in the packet volume)
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Fig. 8: ROC curves: M-SSA has a better detection rate than alternative techniques. A
Hybrid system shows slightly better trade-off for a false positive rate less than 10−5.
5.3 Configuration of Parameters
We now evaluate the impact of the parameters: Lag Window Length (ℓ), the dimen-
sionality k of the projected space and the detection threshold qβ .
5.3.1 Lag window length (ℓ)
The key take away from the theoretical literature is that for an appropriate choice
of ℓ, the Hankel matrix will capture the appropriate dynamics of the underlying sys-
tem (see Takens et al (1981). According to Takens et al (1981); Broomhead and King
(1986a,b) and Ghil et al (2002), the choice of ℓ must consider the trade-off between
the maximum period (frequency) resolved and the statistical confidence of the result.
A large value of ℓ will potentially better capture the long range trends but the size
of the covariance matrix will be larger which will have to be estimated from a time
series of effective length n− ℓ+ 1.
The choice of ℓ has a significant impact on detection performance of different
anomalies. DoS attacks and port scans are emblematic of two types of deviations in
network traffic. DoS attacks are characterized by large changes in a (relatively) small
number of flows as the attacking hosts send a large number of small packets to deplete
system resources in the attacked host (see Fig. 6 and Fig. 5). Thus DoS like anoma-
lies cause high temporal variation (within flows correlation) in the responsible flows
and can be detected using techniques based on time series analysis. Port scans, in the
other hand, are characterized as small increases in a large number of flows (see Fig. 7
and Fig. 5). This is required to detect for spatial correlation across flows (correlation
between the flows) in order to find port scans. We run an experiment to discuss the im-
pact of window length on capturing temporal/spatial correlation, i.e. whithin/between
flow correlation, of the traffic data. ROC curves in Fig. 9a and Fig. 9b present DoS
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(a) DoS detection performancefor different window length.
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(b) Port scan detection performancefor different window length.
Fig. 9: The impact of window length ℓ on detecting DoS attacks and port scans.
Notice that ℓ has almost no impact on on DoS detection but significant impact on
port scan detection.
and port scan detection performance (separately) for varying window length. We de-
scribe the main findings learned from this experiment as follows.
– It is clear that the detection of DoS is almost independent of the window length,
see Fig. 9a. This is expected as DoS attacks cause high correlation within flows
(temporal variations) and this can be always captured even if the window length
is zero, i.e. the common PCA is able to report them.
– Across flows correlation is crucially dependent of window length as shown in
Fig. 9b. Thus the choice of window size has significant impact on detecting port
scans. When the window length is zero the correlation across the flows can not be
captured. when the window length is large across flows correlation is suppressed.
What is required is a localized window where deviation from normal correlation
can be detected. According to the experiment, detecting port scans is improved
for window length of ℓ = {4,8,12} (hours) while it is worsen for smaller/larger
window length.
5.3.2 Grouping indices (k)
Another important parameter of M-SSA affecting results is the grouping indices, i.e.
which components are grouped to provide the reconstructed data. The aim of our
technique is to make a decomposition of the observed traffic into the sum of under-
lying traffic system (can be a number of interpretable components such as a slowly
varying trend, oscillatory components) and a structureless noise, as Y = X +E. The
decomposition of the series Y into these two part is viable if the resulting additive
components X and E are approximately separable from each other. Suppose the the
full reconstructed components are denoted by Vi = Mz for i = {1,2, ...,m× ℓ}. To
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Fig. 10: Absolute values of w-correlation matrix plotted for the first 50 reconstructed
components. The gaps in the scatter plot indicates how many components to select.
select which components to group, we compute the weighted correlation matrix (w-
corr), where each element of the matrix ρi j is defined as:
ρi j =
covw(Vi,V j)
σw(Vi)σw(V j)
using:
σ2w(Vi) =W ′V
′
i Vi , covw(Vi,V j) =W ′V ′i V j
where wt =min{t, ℓ,n−ℓ} for t = {1 : n} is the weighting vector. If the absolute value
of the w-correlations for two Vi and V j is small (ideally zero), so the corresponding
series are almost w-orthogonal and well separable. Fig. 10 shows the absolute val-
ues of w-correlation for the first 50 reconstructed components. This is a grade matrix
plot from red (corresponding to 1) to blue (corresponding to 0), which shows both
the separability and dominance of components with highest eigenvalues values. This
plot is useful to select how many components to select in the reconstruction phase,
as we only need to select the first k components with the largest w-corr values. From
Fig. 10, we observe that the absolute value of the w-correlation for first 10 com-
ponents are naturally grouped, a property that is observed for both the Abilene and
MAWI datasets. We therefore suggest to use the first 10 components for the recon-
struction when using M-SSA. So the X = ∑i=10i=1 Vi and residual space E = Y −X . In
next section we will see that how the values of w-correlation can also be checked for
adjusting the decision parameter (qβ ) so that a false positive rate can be met.
5.3.3 Decision Variable (qβ )
For the decision threshold value (i.e., when to raise an alarm for any anomaly inves-
tigating E space), we use the variables proposed in previous studies (see Lakhina et al
(2004b); Jackson and Mudholkar (1979); Jensen and Solomon (1972))in network anomaly
detection but we address the problem associated with this criteria as discussed by
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Ringberg et al (2007). The threshold qβ is defined as
qβ = Q(λk+1 : λℓ×m,β )
= φ1[ (1−β )
√
(2φ2h2)
φ1 + 1+
φ2h(h−1)
φ 21
]1/h
denotes the threshold for the 1−β confidence level, corresponds to a false alarm rate
of β , and
h = 1− 2φ1φ3
3φ22
, φi =
ℓm
∑
j=k+1
λi for i = 1,2,3.
Based on Jensen and Solomon (1972) the Q in the above equation follows a gaussian
distribution, and this convergence is robust even when the original data deviates from
a gaussian distribution. Ringberg et al (2007) had questioned the robustness of the
Q metric - especially in the low false positive regime. Brauckhoff et al (2009) have
shown that the main reason the metric is not robust is because the use of standard PCA
results in a residual which exhibits temporal correlation. In principle the residual
should correspond to noise and be completely uncorrelated. Thus by ensuring that
temporal correlation (in the case of KL transform) and spatio-temporal correlation
(in the case of M-SSA) is captured by the model, the Q metric is robust.
The w-correlation matrix computed above can help verify if the residual space,
given by E = Y −X where X is the reconstructed space, contains correlated elements
or not. For example, the w-correlation plot in Fig. 10 clearly shows that that when
X is the space spanned by Vi for i > 10, the reconstructed elements are strongly w-
orthogonal in both Abilene and MAWI traffic, resulting in uncorrelated residuals.
6 Related Work
Current network infrastructure is protected against malicious attacks by signature-
based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) (Roesch (1999); Paxson (1998)). However,
it is well known that attackers can circumvent these systems by generating small
modifications of known signatures.
In principle, anomaly-based detection systems (ADS) offer an attractive alterative
to signature-based systems. ADS are based on the notion of ”statistical normality”,
and malicious events are those that cause deviations from normal behavior. The major
challenge is to characterize normal traffic subject to the constraint that network traffic
exhibits non-stationary behavior.
Existing techniques for ADS are based on decomposition methods of network
time series. For example Lakhina et al (2004b,a, 2005) has proposed the use of Princi-
pal Component Analysis (PCA) for detection of network wide anomalies. Zhang et al
(2005) has compared the use of Fourier, Wavelets and ARIMA methods for detection
of link anomalies and then have used ℓ1 optimization to recover the origin-destination
pairs which may have caused the link anomalies to appear. Further refinements on
PCA and state methods like Kalman Filtering have been extensively investigated for
first extracting the normal behavior and then reporting deviations from normality as
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potential anomalies (see Barford et al (2002); Lu and Ghorbani (2009); Zhang et al
(2005); Brutlag (2000); Krishnamurthy et al (2003); Soule et al (2005)).
The mathematical basis of Singular Spectrum Analysis (SSA) is the celebrated re-
sult in nonlinear dynamics due to Takens et al (1981). Taken’s theorem asserts that the
latent non-linear dynamics governing can be recovered using a delayed time embed-
ding of the observable time series. The first practical use of Taken’s theorem for time
series analysis and the connection with spectral methods like singular value decompo-
sition (SVD) was first proposed by Broomhead and King (1986a,c). Further applica-
tion of the technique in climate and geophysical time series analysis has been exten-
sively investigated in Vautard et al (1992); Allen and Smith (1996); Golyandina et al
(2010); Vautard and Ghil (1989); Ghil and Vautard (1991); Yiou et al (1996); Ghil et al
(2002).
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a unified and robust method for network anomaly
detection based on Multivariate Singular Spectrum Analysis (M-SSA). As M-SSA
can detect deviations from both spatial and temporal correlation present in the data, it
allows for the detection of both DoS and port scan attacks. A DoS attack is an example
of temporal deviation while a port scan attack violates spatial correlation. Besides the
use of M-SSA for network anomaly detection, we have carried out a comprehensive
evaluation and compared M-SSA with other approaches based on wavelets, fourier
analysis, kalman filtering and the recently introduced ASTUTE method. We have
also carried out a rigorous analysis of the parameter configurations that accompany
the use of M-SSA and address some of the important issues that have been raised in
the networks community. Finally we have introduced a new labeled dataset from a
large backbone link between Japan and the United States.
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Appendix A Hankelization
The averaging over the diagonals i+ j = const of the matrices XIi is called Hanke-
lization. The purpose of diagonal averaging is to transform a matrix to the form of a
Hankel matrix, which can be subsequently converted to a time series. In other word,
diagonal averaging maps matrices XIi into a time series. to be continued ... Let Han-
kelization operator H acting on any arbitrary matrix to turn it into a Hankle matrix in
an optimal way. By applying the Hankelization procedure to all matrix components
of XIi the expansion will be:
X = XI1 + ...+XIm
3 http://nicta.com.au/
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where XI1 = H XI1 . Since all the matrices on the right-hand side of the expansion are
Hankel matrices, each matrix uniquely specifies the time series and we thus obtain
the decomposition of the original time series:
XI1 ≡ Y1(t) ... XIm ≡ Ym(t)
The complete original series is simply spume of the thus far obtained components.
Y (t) = Y1(t)+Y2(t)+ ...+Ym(t)
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